# Errata of <br> "Superposition with First-Class Booleans and Inprocessing Clausification" 

Visa Nummelin, Alexander Bentkamp, Sophie Tourret, Petar Vukmirović

## Selection of positive literals

Definition 1 allows selection of positive literals if they are of the form $s \approx \perp$. The completeness theorem does not hold up when using this feature.

Here is where the proof breaks: In case 1.2 of the proof of Lemma 30 of the technical report, the conclusion of the indicated superposition inference is not necessarily smaller than the main premise $C$. For example, the rewritten subterm of $C$ might be at the topmost position of the left-hand side of a nonmaximal, selected positive literal $u \approx \perp$ in $C$, and $D$ might contain a literal $u \approx u^{\prime \prime}$ such that $u^{\prime} \succ u^{\prime \prime} \succ \perp$.

Moreover, case 5 in the proof of Lemma 31 of the technical report does not work. $\left.R_{N}^{*}\right|_{\prec C} \not \vDash s \approx \perp$ only implies that $s$ is not reducible to $\perp$, but does not imply that $s$ is reducible to $\mathbf{T}$. Also, even if $s$ is reducible to $\mathbf{T}$ by $\left.R_{N}^{*}\right|_{\prec C}$, it does not necessarily follow that it is reducible by $R_{C}$.

In short, selection of literals of the form $s \approx \perp$ should not be allowed in Definition 1.

## Minor Errata in the Technical Report

Page 14-15 The proof of Lemma 17 is wrong. The term $\{x \mapsto u\} s$ is not necessarily structural smaller than $t$ so induction hypothesis does not apply. The proof can be fixed as follows:

Lemma 6.8 Let $R$ be an interpretable rewrite system. Then $\llbracket t \rrbracket_{R}=[t]$ for all $t \in \mathcal{T}_{\mathrm{G}}$.

Proof. By well-founded induction on $t$ using the left-to-right lexicographic order on $(n(t),|t|)$, where $n(t)$ is the number of quantifiers in $t$ and $|t|$ is the size of the term $t$.

If $t=\mathrm{f}(\bar{s})$, then $\llbracket t \rrbracket_{R}=\mathcal{J}(\mathbf{f})\left(\llbracket \bar{s} \rrbracket_{R}\right) \stackrel{\mathrm{IH}}{=} \mathcal{J}(\mathbf{f})([\bar{s}])=[\mathrm{f}(\bar{s})]=[t]$. The application of the induction hypothesis is justified because for all $i,(n(t),|t|)>\left(n\left(s_{i}\right),\left|s_{i}\right|\right)$.

If $t=\forall x . s$, then we proceed as follows: Let $\mathcal{T}_{\text {QFG }} \subseteq \mathcal{T}_{G}$ be the set of quantifier-free ground terms. We observe that for all ground terms $u \in \mathcal{T}_{G}$, there exists a quantifier-free ground term $u^{\prime} \in \mathcal{T}_{\text {QFG }}$ such that $u \leftrightarrow_{R}^{*} u^{\prime}$. This
follows from (I1) because any quantifier term is of Boolean type. Therefore, we have

$$
\begin{aligned}
\min \left\{\llbracket s \rrbracket_{R}^{\{x \mapsto[u]\}} \mid u \in \mathcal{T}_{\mathrm{G}}\right\} & =\min \left\{\llbracket s \rrbracket_{R}^{\{x \mapsto[u]\}} \mid u \in \mathcal{T}_{\mathrm{QFG}}\right\} \\
& \text { and } \\
\min \left\{[\{x \mapsto u\} s] \mid u \in \mathcal{T}_{\mathrm{G}}\right\} & =\min \left\{[\{x \mapsto u\} s] \mid u \in \mathcal{T}_{\mathrm{QFG}}\right\}
\end{aligned}
$$

It follows that

$$
\begin{aligned}
\llbracket t \rrbracket_{R} & =\min \left\{\llbracket s \rrbracket_{R}^{\{x \mapsto[u]\}} \mid u \in \mathcal{T}_{G}\right\} & & \text { by the definition of term denotation } \\
& =\min \left\{\llbracket s \rrbracket_{R}^{\{x \mapsto[u]\}} \mid u \in \mathcal{T}_{\mathrm{QFG}}\right\} & & \text { by the observation above } \\
& =\min \left\{\llbracket\{x \mapsto u\} s \rrbracket_{R} \mid u \in \mathcal{T}_{\mathrm{QFG}}\right\} & & \text { by Lemma } 6 \\
& =\min \left\{[\{x \mapsto u\} s\rfloor \mid u \in \mathcal{T}_{\mathrm{QFG}}\right\} & & \text { by the induction hypothesis } \\
& =\min \left\{[\{x \mapsto u\} s] \mid u \in \mathcal{T}_{G}\right\} & & \text { by the observation above } \\
& =[\forall x . s] & & \text { by (I4) } \\
& =[t] & &
\end{aligned}
$$

The application of the induction hypothesis is justified because $\{x \mapsto u\} s$ contains less quantifiers than $t$.

If $t=\exists x . s$, we argue analogously.
Page 15-16 The proof of (I1) in part (5) of Lemma 19 is incomplete because (I1) requires us to show that $\mathrm{T} \not \longleftrightarrow \longrightarrow_{R^{*}}^{*} \perp$.

Here is why $\mathbf{T} \not \longleftrightarrow{ }_{R^{*}}^{*} \perp$ : For a proof by contradiction, suppose that $\mathbf{T} \longleftrightarrow{ }_{R^{*}}^{*}$ $\perp$. Since $R^{*}$ is confluent and $\mathbf{T}$ is in normal form, we have $\perp \longrightarrow_{R^{*}}^{*} \mathbf{T}$. By the assumption that the heads of the left-hand sides of rules in $R$ are not logical symbols, we know that there is no rule of the form $\perp \longrightarrow t$ in $R$. By (A1) no rules in $\Delta_{R}^{s}$ have the form $\perp \longrightarrow t$. Thus, $R^{*}$ does not contain rules of the form $\perp \longrightarrow t$, a contradiction.

Page 20 The definition of an inference reducing a counterexample should be as follows: An inference reduces a counterexample $C$ if its main premise is $C$, its side premises are true in $R_{N}^{*}$, and its conclusion $D$ is a clause smaller than $C$ and false in $R_{N}^{*}$. In particular, the conclusion $D$ is not required to be in $N$, contrary to what the the original formulation suggested.

Page 22 Case 2.2 of the proof of Lemma 30 can be simplified: We do not need to inspect the reduction chain of $s \approx t$. By (I3), $s \approx t \rightarrow_{R_{N}^{*}}^{*} \perp$ implies directly that $R_{N}^{*} \not \vDash s \approx t$.

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